Network Defense (CND) has traditionally been provided using reactionary tools such as signature-based detectors, white/blacklisting, intrusion detection/protection systems, etc. While event detection/correlation techniques may identify threats -those threats are then dealt with manually, often employing obstruction-based responses (e.g., blocking). Literature has shown that as threat sophistication grows, perimeter-planted security efforts are ineffective in combating competent adversaries; malicious actors are already seated behind enterprise defenses, navigating the controls.
INTRODUCTION
The modern approach to computer network defense has led to an assumption that our networks will likely be compromised; the malicious actor is already inside the perimeter [1] [2] . Advanced-persistent threat intelligence is needed to address these shortcomings; however, gaps exist. Modern tools are reactionary by nature (e.g., signature-based) and do not enable proactive strategies to combat the threat. Often, response techniques involve unplugging or quarantining compromised hosts, often to the detriment of losing valuable insight into the motivation of the adversary. Research in the area of honeypots has proved insufficient to provide an effective defensive strategy, particularly when they may be detectable [3] . These techniques do little to address the complex problems that analysts are facing; defenses are focused on less sophisticated actors, do not provide a sufficiently realistic environment for adversaries to exercise their tools, and/or are limited in scope due to placement (e.g., as part of the perimeter). As such, enterprises are consistently compromised by multiple classes of adversaries, despite significant amounts of money and effort. As these threats become more aggressive and wide-spread [4] , there emerges a need for different, proactive strategies beyond the existing plug-and-play and commercial solutions that exist to date.
We have developed, implemented, and tested a novel computer network operations (CNO) architecture that enables proactive defense by managing and monitoring the enterprise's resource allocations, network flows and endpoints. Our Deception Network leverages several emerging concepts in the domains of software defined networking (SDN), cloud computing, introspection and deception. The Deception Network system: (1) enables the detection and identification of anomalous access and intrusions; (2) adjusts to the dynamic nature of adversaries by live-migrating them into deception environments of high-fidelity; and (3) provides a mechanism to discover and react to the adversary's attacks in a methodical and proactive manner.
Additionally, the technologies developed allow network defenders to gather information on the adversary's tools, tactics and procedures (TTPs) through introspection at the network and host layers. This information provides insight into what, why and how malicious actors conduct their operations.
The modularity of the Deception Network technologies has also enabled us to explore other cutting-edge defense techniques, such as Moving Target Defense. Most recent MTDs have planted security mechanism at the network layer, using IP and port overlays to obscure networks from reconnaissance. Other techniques involve implementation at the host layer, randomizing application address space or host operating systems to thwart exploitation. Within the Deception Network model, we propose an MTD based on entire network enclaves as well as host attributes, characteristics and files. In this paper, we will cover the details of our Deception Network environment, as well as alternative implementations to support deception-based MTDs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II covers our approach to computer network deception and lays out our Deception Network architecture; Section III briefly covers MTD and how our architecture is extended to be an MTD, to include a Proof-of-Concept; related works and discussion is carried out in Section IV. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section V.
II. COMPUTUER NETWORK DECEPTION
Recent changes in the computing environment such as cloud computing and software defined networking (SDN) make this an ideal time to change the defense paradigm. The chasm between virtual and real infrastructure is closing; corporations are moving toward highly virtualized environments with SDN for day-to-day operations. While predictability in the computing environment is foundational to an adversary's success, the ubiquity of virtualization plays to the defender's advantage.
With this in mind, we have developed a deception framework to implement solutions that have negative impacts on an adversary, specifically:
• Obscuring the real target(s) • Devaluing information gathering • Causing the adversary to waste time and resources • Forcing the adversary to reveal advanced capabilities • Exposing adversary intent • Increasing the difficulty of attack planning • Limiting the scope of the attack • Limiting the duration of a successful attack Hence, the Deception Network is built upon a virtualization, or emulation platform. Models of a production network are generated then imported into the virtualization platform to create two distinct networks: an operational network and a deception network. Particular network elements and devices are duplicated between the two networks. For example, virtual routers are completely duplicated, from routes to interface MAC addresses. Certain network services may also be duplicated, such as DHCP/DNS or file servers. Virtual desktops, or endpoints, and dynamic services are only booted in the operational network. The two networks are completely separated via logical and/or physical network segmentation.
On each of the host systems, virtual switches are used to connect the virtual machines (VM). Between hosts, physical switches form a communication backplane. Both the virtual and physical switches are OpenFlow compatible and thereby managed by SDN controller(s). Furthermore, on each host a hypervisor is used to manage virtual machine operations within the virtualization platform. We have developed a virtual machine introspection (VMI) application that rests between the hypervisor and the VM. Between the VMI application and the SDN controller applications, complete visibility of host and network actions is realized.
When an endpoint is suspected of malicious activity, the live-migration process from an operational network to the deception network is initiated. First, the SDN controller is queried for all current and expired connections the endpoint has established. For those connections that involve endpoints local to the operational environment, VM cloning is commenced. For those connections to endpoints outside of the local network, SDN flow-rules are enqueued. When cloning of the endpoints is completed, the new VMs are copied and forked in the deception environment, with previous state still intact. At this point, the suspect VM is then live-migrated into the deception network; in parallel, flow rules are installed on the SDN controlled switches to force traffic between external endpoints and the migrated VM -maintaining all previously established TCP connections. These operations are displayed in Figure 1 below, in the context of a single compute node. (2) Introspect without introducing artifacts into the running system; and (3) Allow full control over guest system.
Our VMI is implemented as a loadable kernel module for Linux, specifically for the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) hypervisor [5] , and is thusly named KVMi. KVMi creates ring buffered character devices on the host's device file system through which it may produce output through and also receive input as well. KVMi works by taking control of the VM-exit handler before KVM gets to run. After which it does its processing, and then decides to either pass control back to KVM, or simply let the guest resume. During these exits, KVMi tracks each VM it sees, determines its operating system, and then adds systems of interest to a set to do further introspection.
Each VM of interest is dynamically analyzed to determine offsets of key structures in memory. This is done in multiple ways, including walking exports of portable executable (PE) files, code disassembly, and simple recognition of data in relation to other objects. Upon computing all the necessary offsets for each VM, KVMi begins tracking interesting objects on that system (e.g., processes, DLLs, drivers). When new data is found, text-based data is sent to one of many character devices.
From the monitoring perspective, the KVMi provides dynamic linked libraries and drivers (lists as well as full reconstructions), process lists, system calls, memory accesses and file executions. KVMi also has the ability to make modifications to the guest system, such as hiding or changing guest files in memory or redirecting execution.
Data output from both the KVMi character devices and the SDN controller(s) are ingested by an analytic engine to provide a rich set of analytics. Modifications to the VM and environment by KVMi and the SDN elements provide the ability to dynamically modify the environment to promote fidelity and maintain interest, or stifle the actions of the adversary -such as corrupting outbound packets during file exfiltration or modifying guest files with watermarks or executable code.
In the end -if the suspicions for the VM are unfounded, the VM may be migrated back into the operational environment. However, if suspicions are confirmed and the adversary leaves the compromised VM after some time, all artifacts of the deception network (flow logs, KVMi logs/data, VMs themselves) may be cataloged and further inspected off-line.
A. Approach to Deception Network Migration
The processes of migration and cloning are comprised of three functions within the Deception Environment. Those functions are defined by the following algorithms: migration, clone and flow.
The first of these algorithms is the migration algorithm. A virtual machine identifier is provided to the algorithm. Algorithm 2 is the cloning algorithm. It satisfies both the functionality of cloning a virtual machine from the Operational Network to the Deception Network, as well as deleting cloned virtual machines.
Algorithm 3 covers the necessary actions to install SDN flow rules between the Operational and Deception Networks. It handles both the installation of the rules for a migration, as well the removal of the rules for a reversion. It has the capability to track both current and expired flow rules; at the time of this writing, flows are installed for both sets.
B. Approach to Virtual Machine Introspection
As mentioned, KVMi dynamically analyzes each VM of interest is to determine offsets of key structures in memory. Leveraging the basis to locate functions in memory, the ability to single step or set breakpoints become realizable. To do so, KVMi uses the monitor-trap-flag (MTF) bit for single stepping, which requires the full handling of the VM-exit itself without passing control to KVM at all. For breakpoints, KVMi uses permissions in Intel's extended-page-tables (EPT) to trap on read, write, and/or execution on arbitrary sized chunks of memory. Additionally, KVMI uses an EPT execution breakpoint on the system call handler; a callback is used to record all system calls from each VM into a character device.
KVMi also provides guest-to-host translation of each memory page of each new module detected by the basic introspection capabilities (note: noncontiguous pages), and sends this to another character device. This allows a user space tool on the host to monitor the character device and dump each mapped-in page of each module to the host's disk, directly from guest memory.
Finally, KVMi also has the ability to make modifications to guest systems. One example is VM aging; this is done by first finding the offset of the Windows kernel's boot timestamp, as well as process creation timestamps. This provides the ability to arbitrarily set the age of a system. Furthermore, KVMi has the ability to call arbitrary functions inside the guest, whether they are in kernel or user space, without an in-guest agent. This allows the automation of desired functionalities in the guest, or to get results from functions in the operating system.
III. DECEPTION AS A MTD
In this section we briefly cover the elements of MTD, our approach to Deception as a MTD, and a proof-of-concept implementation.
A. Moving Target Defense
The primary aim of MTD is to control change across multiple system dimensions toward the end of increasing uncertainty and complexity for the attacker [6] . The reason for this approach is systems, either small or large, are comprised of some number of static components. On large systems, such as networks, these components are often the first steps an adversary uses in order to gather information or break into the system. Or, in the case of smaller systems on hosts, static elements allow adversaries the ability to craft malicious exploits that take advantage of those unchanging structures. The promise of MTD is those 'static' attributes in a system's threat may be modified enough in order to derail attacks, such as the Georgian cyber maneuver to thwart attack in 2008 [7] .
Current MTD techniques essentially fall into two general categories: host implementations or network-based overlays. Host implementations invariably require the installation of custom software on host systems or the introduction of additional custom hardware or software appliances into the network. The authors of [8] provide further granularity in this domain, binning into host-based MTDs by runtime environment, software, data and/or platforms. Network implementations employ new MTD-based topologies "on top of" the existing network infrastructure that may modify such things as addresses or protocols (but may do nothing to protect the underlying network). Our idea for the Deception MTD is to change not only the entire view of the network, but also attributes on hosts in the network, whilst still leaving crumbs for adversaries to chase.
B. Extending Deception to a MTD
In our deception framework we create parallel operations and deception environments, the latter of which is of high fidelity to lure and entertain the adversary, in hopes the actor will expose their TTPs or intentions without affecting the operational network. In the MTD context, we treat the deception environment as yet another operational environment. Like the deception environment, the underlying communication infrastructure is still the same between the two networks (routers, switching, services). Except now, rather than using the second network to contain the threat, it is used to hide the defender.
As mentioned, our Deception Network incorporates three primary technologies that provide for the malleability of endpoints and their interconnected networks: cloud (virtualization), SDN and virtual machine introspection. The former two allow the modification of the network environment and topologies in an agile fashion to change attributes at the network layer. The latter allows the modification of virtual machine attributes, to include files, at the host layer. The extension of these technologies provide the ability to modify the threat surface for each of their respective areas to produce moving targets, more specifically: Rather than migrate a single VM and fork all currently (or expired) connected VMs, we propose to fork the entire subnetwork or enclave into a deception environment. This aspect of MTD provides large-scale cyber maneuver of endpoints at a single instance in time. Furthermore, by forking the VMs rather than migrating them, it leaves the former subnetwork still populated with those virtual machines. Defenders may then allow malicious actors to proceed in their attacks; however, using KVMi and deception applications, defenders may corrupt files, traffic and even endpoints as needed, and injecting further diversions, VMs, honey and rabbit holes.
C. Deception MTD Proof-of-Concept
To demonstrate the feasibility our MTD concept, we generated a small virtual network enclave in our virtualization platform.
The operational network enclave (Network1) consisted of seven routers, seven endpoints (workstations) and two servers. A border gateway router, three QoS routers (for future work), and three subnet routers comprised the communication infrastructure. The servers were contained in one subnetwork, the seven endpoints in another, and a final network reserved for in-band forensic tools (for future work). A second operational network enclave (Network2) consisted of the same routers, without the gateway router, and the three subnetworks. In this operational network the two servers were preplaced. In line with our approach, some number of virtual machine endpoints would be migrated (or forked) from Network1 to Network2. Figure 2 depicts this scenario.
Modification to our API to trigger migration instead now forced migration of the entire network enclave, vice one machine and its adjacent connections. Furthermore, instead of flow-rules installed for a singular endpoint to external connections, the flow rules were now installed for all VMs forked; these flow rules were limited to approved (or untainted) external connections to and from the network. To maintain connectivity to malicious external actors, and prevent them from entering Network2, flow-rules were installed to keep those connections to the Network1 subnetworks. While the process described above is reactionary in nature, a proactive approach in line with MTD tenets may be preferred. To this end, we investigated the amount of time taken to stand up new network enclaves on-the-fly and fork some number virtual machines into it. In order to minimize external influences such as network and host node variation, we set up the experiment on a single compute node with the following attributes: 32 Intel Xeon E5-2670 CPUs and 132GB RAM. Using the network topology described here, we recorded the average amount of time taken over 20 iterations to deploy the entire enclave (see Table 1 ). The underlying hypervisor in our virtualization platform is KVM/QEMU. To interact with the virtual machine, each is booted with a QEMU Machine Protocol (QMP) socket enabled. For our experiments, we often impose a 30-second wait time for all the sockets to the VMs to initialize. Without that wait time, full deployment of the network took under 15 seconds.
To test the virtual machine time-to-migrate, we set up a small factorial experiment based on virtual machine memory size and number of virtual machines. The virtual machines we tested with had installed Windows 7; the VMs utilized the same backing-disk with the following variations in memory: 2GB, 4GB, 8GB. For the number of virtual machines to migrate, we incremented between 1 and 7. The results for this experiment are shown in Figure 3 .
The experiment was conducted 10 times to produce the box plots of Figure 3 . To migrate 7 virtual machines of 8GB memory, an approximate upper bound of 85s would be required. For 7 virtual machines of 4GB, 80s. And for 2G, 75s. While code optimization, hardware upgrade and proactive VM snapshoting may shave off some seconds, we feel the ballpark figures adequately approximate MTD intervals for proactive network migration.
IV. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
In a review of literature and industry, we identified similar works and vendors in this domain of deception [10] [11][12] [13] . All approach deception for the sake of TTP extraction and/or high-fidelity honey pots. However, we feel our work is unique in that it fuses several different technologies areas to produce a single system. In this context, some of the unique features of our Deception Network include:
• Endpoint (VM) specific introspection, reach-in and modification, VM and service aging techniques, file system generation and aging.
• Environment traffic generation and virtual machine console replay, tailored deception, infrastructure and enterprise service emulation and virtual/physical networking.
• Within the network, the ability to change what and where the attacker is logically located, and the ability to change and modify the content of the adversary on exfiltration and infiltration attempts.
It is our Deception Network components that support these features that make it malleable to produce other security approaches, such as MTD.
At present, MTDs implementations may be found at the network layer to thwart reconnaissance attacks [13] [14] [15] [16] . Other techniques involve implementation at the host layer, randomizing application address space [16] [17] or host operating systems and platforms [18] [19] . Too often though, MTD techniques are tailored for very specific usecases, and involve endpoint-based obfuscation techniques to distract the attacker. Our approach differs from these in that we begin by migration of the entire network enclave, to include endpoints, to produce the maneuver.
In the literature, there is also research being in the area network migration. The authors of [20] [21] also employ SDN in their research of network migration. However, their work focuses primarily on migration of SDN switch state in conjunction with virtual machine migration primarily for data center operations (e.g, server consolidation, load balancing, maintenance, fault-tolerance), whereas our work focuses less on switch state and more on network environment and fidelity for cyber security. Network migration is also explored in [22] , and furthermore in [23] for DDoS protection. In their research, they focus on network migration at the gateway and IP layer, leveraging technique like route state cloning, and often for specific platforms.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The promise of an MTD is that a defender may modify the threat surface by actively modifying parameters within the threat surface. Within the Deception Network model, we proposed an MTD based on entire network enclaves as well as host attributes, characteristics and files, which resulted in a simple proof-of-concept for the migration an entire network enclave between logically separate network environments.
We intend to continue our research by producing a methodology to test our concepts, to include deeper experimental analysis on our approach. We also intend to discuss specific uses cases for our MTD, as well as examining and addressing the challenges that come with it. Within the system itself, we intend to investigate in more detail the ability to run multiple concurrent enclave migrations, multiple fixed network environments to migrate through, and fractional enclave migration. We would also like to further investigate host-based file modification, IP address and subnet rotations with forced DHCP lease renewal with IP address translation.
